On June 5 th , 1997, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) voted to adopt a system of decimal price trading, changing its longstanding practice of using 1/8 th s. While the decimal system does not go into place until the turn of the century, the NYSE began trading stocks in 1/16 th s, so-called "teenies," as an intermediate step on June 24 th , 1997.
3 thereby encouraging existing investors to trade more frequently and/or new investors to begin trading.
The debate over whether there is an optimal tick size clearly has important implications for exchanges. Holding other factors constant, exchanges earn revenue in direct proportion to trading volume. Since the arguments for and against a significant tick size suggest a relation between tick size and trading volume, they also suggest a relation between tick size and exchange revenue.
The ideal time to test theories concerning a market's optimal tick size is when the tick size is changed. Unfortunately, changes to the tick size are made infrequently, so direct tests are sparse. Bacidore (1997) examined the effect of the change to decimal pricing for stocks traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange. He reports that, for stocks over $5 (Cdn), effective spreads dropped by 26 percent for stocks cross-listed on other exchanges and 20 percent for non cross-listed stocks. For the U.S. stock markets, the only direct evidence has appeared in the popular press. The Wall Street Journal (June 25, 1997) reported that quoted bid/ask spreads on the NYSE fell by more than 10 cents a share from the day before to the day after the change to 1/16 th s for some large market capitalization stocks. Spreads also dropped by more than 5 cents a share for some lowand mid-capitalization stocks. The same article reported that NASDAQ spreads dropped 10 percent during the first five days after the switch to 1/16 th s on June 2, 1997 versus the nineteen days beforehand and that AMEX spreads dropped 7.6 percent after a switch to 1/16 th s on May 7, 1997.
Indirect evidence has also been reported. Angel (1997) argues that there is an optimal stock price level for a given tick size that balances the positive and negative impact of tick size on spreads, depth, and liquidity. He argues that the remarkably stable average price of NYSE stocks this century is the result of the constant tick size. Firms can use stock split decisions in order to maintain the optimal tick-to-price ratio. Harris (1994) uses data prior to the NYSE's switch to 1/16 th s and runs a series of regressions to predict 4 how spreads, depth, and trading volume would change if the NYSE lowered the tick size from 1/8 th to 1/16 th .
The purpose of this study is to measure changes in the trading environment and investor welfare resulting from the NYSE's switch to 1/16 th s on June 24, 1997. The study is divided into five sections. In the first, we provide a detailed description of the data and the measurements we use to assess market impact. Section II contains an analysis of the effects of the switch to 1/16 th s at an aggregate market level. In section III, we stratify the stocks in the sample by price per share and dollar trade size to determine whether stocks were affected differentially by the switch to 1/16 th s. Section IV contains an analysis of NYSE market share. In the last section, we summarize the major findings of the study. From the data in the combined trade and quote file, we computed a number of measures of market activity and bid/ask spreads for each stock each day. Two measures of the quoted spread require definition:
DATA AND VARIABLE MEASUREMENT
Percentage quoted spread: the average of the ratio of the quoted bid/ask spread to the bid/ask price midpoint; and, Volume-weighted average quoted spread: the average of the quoted bid/ask spreads during the day weighted by the proportion of daily trading volume executed while each pair of quotes was in effect.
We measure the percentage quoted spread to illustrate that spreads differ by the level of share price. 6 Trading costs for low price per share stocks are higher. The volume-weighted quoted spread weights the prevailing quotes by the number of shares traded (as a proportion of total daily trading volume) while the quotes were in effect. Consequently, this measure of quoted spread is more accurate a priori since transactions at the prevailing quotes indicate that prices were "firm."
Our measures of market depth and market quality also merit comment. We attempt to measure market quality with an index that is designed to capture the tradeoff between quoted bid/ask spread and market depth. 
Now, suppose that after the change to 1/16 th s, the spread narrows from a quarter to 1/8 th but the market depth falls to 500 on each side of the market. The post-change MQI is
reflecting no change in the quality of the market. In other words, although the quoted spread has been reduced, the market depth has been reduced commensurately with no change in market quality. On the other hand, if the market depth remained at 1,000 shares on each side of the market, the MQI would double.
A large portion of trading volume takes place within the quoted bid/ask spread.
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We document this behavior by measuring the proportion of daily trades (and the proportion of daily dollar volume) executed within the prevailing bid/ask price quotes. To account for the fact that trades take place within the prevailing quotes, we measure the "effective" spread as twice the absolute difference between the trade price and the midpoint of the quoted bid/ask spread, that is, Effective spread trade price (bid price ask price
7 Note that the effective spread measured in this way will always be less than the quoted spread. We also measure the volume-weighted effective spread for the same reason as we measure the volume-weighted quoted spread.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IN AGGREGATE
The basic framework of our analysis is to compare measures of trading volume, bid/ask spreads, market depth, and market quality in the 20 trading days prior to the for example, will fall if prices rise and spreads are constant. So we need to interpret some of our results with caution. Daily trading volume in shares varied from day to day and also showed a modest increase on average. This market-wide increase in trading volume will also affect some of our measures. We might expect market makers to increase their quoted depth in a more liquid trading environment, for example. Apparently, the move to a smaller price gradation has created more opportunities to negotiate trade prices within the spread.
Microstructure measures
The effective bid/ask spread measure accounts for trades within the quoted levels.
The effective bid/ask spread is reduced by 13.13 percent on average, and 8.77 percent when weighted by volume. The volume-weighted average is probably more important in the sense that it measures the actual cost being incurred by investors. The difference 10 between the two measures reflects the fact that the reduction in spread has been larger for less active stocks than more active stocks.
Robustness Tests
The evidence reported in Exhibit 2 shows that the introduction of 1/16 th s coincided with changes in the nature of trading and trading costs. In particular, trading costs have decreased significantly and trading volumes have increased. Since changes in the bid/ask spread are the focus of much of the debate surrounding a change in the tick size, we need to determine whether the reduction in the spread is attributable to the change in the tick size and not attributable to changes in trading volume, volatility, and market competition.
To control for these other factors, we perform a set of time series regressions for each stock in the sample. Theoretical models of the quoted bid/ask spread (e.g. Stoll (1978) ) predict that spreads are determined by, among other factors, trading volume and price volatility. The higher is the trading volume, the greater is the market makers' time rate of transaction, and the lower is the margin that they need to cover the fixed cost of operation. Spreads should also vary with price risk. The greater is the price variability of a stock, the greater is the likelihood that an adverse price move occurs while the stock is in the market maker's inventory. The higher is the price risk, therefore, the higher is the spread. The regression model also includes a measure of the inter-market competition for the stocks. This is simply the number of exchanges that make a market in the stock.
Ideally, intra-market competition should also be included. Unfortunately, there is no good way to measure the number of market makers standing ready to trade at each specialist's post. Finally, the regression includes an indicator variable to measure the shift in dependent variable over time after controlling for changes in the other independent variables. In other words, after controlling for other effects on the quoted spread, the reduction in spread as a result of the change in tick size is more prevalent than it was before. Of the quoted spread's determinants, the strongest appears to be price volatility. The volatility coefficient a 3 is significantly positive for 718 stocks in the sample of 2,702.
When average market depth in shares is used as the dependent variable, the regression results are qualitatively similar to those of the quoted spread. The frequency of depth reductions, 2,201 of 2,703, is greater than it was in Exhibit 2. Market depth is reduced significantly for 1,291 of the stocks in the sample. The risk variable again enters significantly for a large number of stocks. But, here the effect is negative, as expected. The greater is the price variability, the lower is the number of shares that the market maker is willing to trade at the prevailing quotes. Interestingly, the reduction in tick size has not only reduced the size of the quoted bid/ask spread for low-priced shares but it has also increased the frequency with which trades occur within the prevailing spread. Panel E of Exhibit 6 shows that the percentage of the dollar value of all trades during the day occurring at prices within the prevailing quotes has increased 31.74 percent for low-priced shares. These increases occur across the board for all share price quintiles, decreasing monotonically as share price increases.
So, low-priced shares appear to have been doubly blessed. First, the minimum price change of 1/8 th prior to the change appears to have been binding on the quoted spread, so the quoted spread has now been reduced. Second, the refined price gradation has increased the frequency with which low-priced shares are traded at prices within the prevailing quotes. Smaller dollar value trades experienced greater reductions in the effective bid/ask spread-in excess of 11 percent. These reductions appear to have had the desired effect, in the short-run at least, since the NYSE market share appears to have increased. X a a a a a
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